INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1996 if a permanent resident was convicted of a crime that subjected her to deportation, she was often eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation, known as 212(c) relief. 1 A waiver of deportation was granted under 212(c) if the immigrant could show substantial equitable ties with the United States, including a U.S. citizen spouse or children, U.S. business ownership, and employment in the United States. 2 These 212(c) waivers were routinely granted in more than fifty percent of cases. 3 In 1996, however, Congress overhauled immigration law through two bills-the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 4 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 5 A central goal of the bills was to facilitate the deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes. To do this, AEDPA restricted and IIRIRA entirely eliminated the 212(c) waiver mechanism, meaning that permanent residents convicted of a greatly expanded list of crimes would be automatically deported, regardless of how deeply connected they were with the United States.
While prospective elimination of 212(c) relief was politically controversial, it did not raise significant legal or constitutional questions. However, the Justice Department's subsequent interpretation of IIRIRA as eliminating 212(c) relief retroactively 6 for immigrants who committed their crimes or were convicted of their crimes while 212(c) relief was still available created a clear conflict with the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence, embodied in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. 7 After six years of litigation and the wrongful deportation of many permanent residents deported without recourse to a 212(c) waiver, the Supreme Court corrected the Justice Department's error, and the ratification of that error by many lower courts, in the landmark INS v. St. Cyr decision. 8 In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that (1) the retroactivity framework of Landgraf functioned identically in immigration cases as in other cases; and (2) because Congress did not explicitly state that IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) relief applied retroactively, the bill could not be used to deprive immigrants of 212(c) relief in a retroactive manner. 9 While St. Cyr should have put an end to the controversy over 212(c) relief, lower courts have continued to permit the deportation of permanent residents without recourse to 212(c) relief, even though they committed their crimes, proceeded to trial after rejecting a plea bargain, or were convicted of their crimes prior to passage of IIRIRA.
low the fundamental dictate of St. Cyr, which is to fully apply the Landgraf retroactivity analysis to cases involving immigrants.
The persistent failure of most lower courts to faithfully apply retroactivity analysis to 212(c) cases is important in at least two respects. First, on the level of individual justice, the failure means that permanent residents who actually qualify to apply for 212(c) waivers are still being summarily deported, leaving behind U.S. citizen spouses and children, businesses, employment, and community ties.
Second, on the level of coherent jurisprudence, the failure means that the Supreme Court's retroactivity framework has been bifurcated-there is one set of retroactivity rules primarily applied to corporate defendants, and a second, much harsher set of retroactivity rules applied to immigrants convicted of crimes.
13 Particular concern is raised by the fact that harsher rules are being applied to a small, unpopular, and politically weak group of people. After all, one of the primary arguments against retroactive laws, voiced originally by the Framers of the Constitution, 14 is that such laws can be used by the government to target unpopular and weak groups, by heaping consequence upon consequence well after those individuals have acted. 201, 235 (2000) , authored the Fourth Circuit's Olatunji decision, 387 F.3d 383, which struck down the retroactive application of an IIRIRA provision. Also, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 363 (1999) , offers the most probing review of the concept of retroactivity. Meanwhile, Janet Reno, Attorney General to Democratic President Bill Clinton, was responsible for originally applying the repeal of 212(c) retroactively to all immigrants, regardless of when their crimes were committed. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing Reno's interpretation of IIRIRA as eliminating 212(c) relief retroactively).
14 See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Federalists' advocacy for a ban on retroactivity in the Constitution). Supreme Court's basic retroactivity framework will go far in preventing this invidious result.
This Comment argues that, since St. Cyr, the lower courts have not followed the Supreme Court's mandate to fully apply the Landgraf framework to 212(c) cases in two important ways. First, they have failed to recognize that retroactivity analysis is fundamentally concerned with statutory construction (i.e., whether the language of the statute indicates its temporal scope and the class to which the statute applies), coupled with a presumption against retroactivity. Instead, they have incorrectly introduced an individual reliance requirement into the Landgraf test. Thus, even where the law would not apply to a broad class of people because of the presumption against retroactivity, lower courts have found that individual members of that class have not "earned" the right to be protected from retroactive application because they did not actually rely on the prior state of the law.
Despite the lower courts' misinterpretation of St. Cyr, the recent circuit court decisions in Ponnapula v. Ashcroft and Olatunji v. Ashcroft have made significant strides toward full application of Landgraf to immigration cases by holding that reliance is not a requirement for a finding of impermissible retroactive effect. 15 Given the holdings of St. Cyr and Landgraf, this is clearly the correct conclusion and should be followed by the remaining circuits. Nonetheless, a split among the circuits has developed on this question, with the Third 16 and Fourth
17
holding that individual reliance is not a requirement for a finding of impermissible retroactivity, and the Second 18 and Ninth 19 Circuits holding that an individualized assessment is appropriate. Given this split and the question's importance for retroactivity jurisprudence 15 See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 491 ("The Supreme Court has never required actual reliance or evidence thereof in the Landgraf line of cases, and has in fact assiduously eschewed an actual reliance requirement."); Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 388-89 (" [W] e hold that reliance (whether subjective or objective) is not a requirement of impermissible retroactivity and that the government's notice is insufficient to overcome the impermissibly retroactive effect of IIRIRA on Olatunji's guilty plea."). 16 Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 491. 17 Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 388-89. 18 See Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Because those aliens who went to trial prior to the elimination of § 212(c) cannot show that they altered their conduct in reliance on the availability of such relief, we hold that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) relief is not impermissibly retroactive as applied to them.").
19 See Kelava v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We have cabined St. Cyr to the plea context, because of the alien's reliance on existing law in that situation."). more broadly, the Supreme Court should step in to resolve the question.
Second, the lower courts have failed to follow the Landgraf line of cases on the question of which past conduct is protected from retroactive application of new laws. Currently, in the 212(c) context, no circuit views the immigrant's commission of the crime as the essential conduct for analysis. This means that if a permanent resident committed her crime in 1990, for example, while 212(c) relief was still available, but was not convicted until after 1996, she would not be deemed eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation. This consensus has developed despite the fact that under a complete Landgraf analysis, and particularly when considering the decisional rules offered in Martin v. Hadix, 20 the commission of the crime is the only logical point of analysis to determine an impermissible retroactive effect. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if an immigrant committed a crime while 212(c) relief was still available, she should be deemed eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation; to hold otherwise would create an impermissible retroactive effect.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND A. Statutory Evolution of 212(c) Relief
For at least a century, federal immigration control laws have provided for the deportation of noncitizens, including permanent residents, who have been convicted of certain crimes. 21 Before the 1996 20 527 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1999) . Two potential decisional rules are offered in Martin v. Hadix to determine which past act is relevant for retroactivity analysis. The majority and dissenting opinions both suggest the following rule: At what point could the party have avoided all the consequences of the new law? Id. at 357-58, 369. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion suggests asking what activity the statute was intended to regulate. Id. at 363. The rules proposed in Martin v. Hadix are discussed in more detail later in Part III.C. 21 The definition of the crimes that render immigrants eligible for deportation has changed over the years. S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), added deportation for conviction of an "aggravated felony," which included murder and any drug trafficking crimes. By 1994, the INA provided for deportation of immigrants convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude, or one crime of moral turpitude within five years of entry plus a conviction for a crime for which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I-II) (Supp. V 1994) (establishing grounds for deportation). But changes to federal immigration law, deportation was not mandatory or automatic; immigration statutes in force prior to 1996 each contained a mechanism for discretionary waivers of deportation if the immigrant possessed certain qualifications or other equities warranted a waiver.
22
The Immigration Act of 1917 included a discretionary waiver process through the Secretary of Labor, 23 while the more modern statutes gave that power to the Attorney General through the 212(c) mechanism. 24 Before 1990, permanent residents 25 who were convicted of a deportable offense and had lived continuously in the United States for seven years were permitted to apply for a waiver of deportation from the Attorney General. 26 Changes to 212(c) in 1990 further restricted eligibility for such waivers. 27 These changes meant that immigrants these provisions all provided for a 212(c) waiver of deportation under meritorious circumstances. For a discussion of the development of 212(c) legislation over the last century, see were not permitted to apply for 212(c) relief if they had been convicted of an "aggravated felony" as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994) 28 and, in addition, had actually served at least five years in prison.
29
Prior to IIRIRA's passage, the 212(c) relief mechanism worked in the following manner: If an immigrant who had lived continuously in the United States for seven years was convicted of a deportable offense, she could then be ordered deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 30 After receiving an order to appear to answer the deportation charge, she was eligible to apply for 212(c) relief from the Attorney General if she had not been convicted of an aggravated felony, or had been convicted of an aggravated felony but had served less than five years in prison. 31 The immigrant would then make her case for the waiver at an administrative hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ). There was a "strong likelihood that such relief would be granted" by the IJ. 32 One study showed that 212(c) relief was granted in 51.5% of final decisions in cases between 1989 and 1995, 33 and more than 10,000 immigrants received waiver grants during that same period.
34
The IJ's decision whether to grant 212(c) relief was guided by a longstanding Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) standard. 35 Factors to be considered included: "[T]he seriousness of the offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration of the alien's 28 The statute lists twenty-one categories of crime that are defined as "aggravated felonies," including, inter alia, murder, drug trafficking, and illicit dealing in firearms. 29 residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed Forces."
36 If the crime was particularly serious, the immigrant would have to show more equities to outweigh the harm of the offense.
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The policy underlying the availability of relief was that once an immigrant had paid for her crime within the criminal justice system, the United States would benefit more from her continued presence than from her deportation, which would cause disruptions to her family in the United States, her business or employer, and her other community ties.
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On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 39 Section 440(d) of AEDPA excluded numerous classes of immigrants from eligibility for 212(c) relief, including immigrants "ordered deported because of a conviction for an aggravated felony, for a drug conviction, for certain weapons or national security violations, and for multiple convictions involving crimes of moral turpitude."
40
AEDPA also removed the five-year "time served" qualification of the 1990 INA. 41 Getting rid of this provision meant that immigrants who were convicted of acts that technically qualified as aggravated felonies, but who received only a suspended sentence because the circumstances of their crime rendered them virtually blameless, would now receive mandatory deportations. common misdemeanor offenses, such as petty theft (shoplifting) or simple assault, qualify as aggravated felonies because they are punishable by a maximum of one year, even if the common state sentencing schemes of probation or community service and a suspended sentence are imposed.").
On September 30, 1996, just five months after the passage of AEDPA, Congress acted to further expedite deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes, by enacting IIRIRA. 43 Among other changes, IIRIRA repealed 212(c) relief completely, 44 and replaced it with a much narrower relief mechanism called cancellation of removal. 45 A permanent resident is only eligible for cancellation of removal if she has not been convicted of an "aggravated felony," regardless of the amount of time she served in jail. 46 Further increasing the restrictive nature of the new law, IIRIRA redefined the term "aggravated felony" to encompass scores of new offenses, including misdemeanors and low-level felonies 47 that are not understood to be aggravated felonies in any other context. 48 In addition, Congress made this redefinition of "aggravated felony" explicitly retroactive to crimes committed before passage of IIRIRA, a result that has been upheld, and properly so, by the courts. 49 These IIRIRA 43 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 44 IIRIRA § 304(b). 45 IRIIRA § 304(a)(3). IIRIRA also replaced the term "deportation" with the term "removal," making "cancellation of removal" the semantic equivalent of a "waiver of deportation." Id. 46 Id. (outlining the eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal). 47 See IIRIRA § 321 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); see also Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The definition of 'aggravated felony' has been retroactively expanded to include dozens more offenses, including misdemeanor and low-level felony offenses."). This congressional redefinition of "aggravated felony," though contrary to statutory precedent and normal usage, has been upheld by the courts. See id. at 486 (noting that courts have upheld this expanded definition and providing examples in which misdemeanors were held to be aggravated felonies). Therefore, minor offenses have resulted in the deportation of immigrants who, in many cases, had lived in the United States almost their entire lives and had no ties to the country to which they were deported. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 149-50, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a misdemeanor theft of a video game punished by a one-year suspended sentence is an aggravated felony under the redefinition and affirming an order of deportation of the immigrant to a country in which he had not lived since he was six years old); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a misdemeanor petty larceny offense is an aggravated felony under the redefinition).
48 See Graham, 169 F.3d at 792-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that, in fact, misdemeanors qualify as felonies under the redefinition, and reasoning that Congress simply made a drafting error in choosing the term "aggravated felony").
49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after [September 30, 1996] ."). The retroactive application of the definition of "aggravated felony" to convictions obtained before the passage of IIRIRA is permissible because (1) Congress explicitly mandated the retroactive application; (2) deportation is interpreted to be a civil, not a criminal penalty, and so is not subject to ex post facto protections; and (3) the retroactive application is not otherwise changes made immigrants automatically deportable if they had been convicted of crimes that fell within the new, very broad definition of "aggravated felony."
B. Early Interpretations of 212(c) Relief and Retroactivity
Following the passage of AEDPA, questions immediately arose about the scope of the legislation's strict limits on 212(c) eligibilitydid the new limits apply only prospectively or retroactively as well? The BIA held, in a 7-5 decision, that AEDPA's 212(c) eligibility limits did not apply retroactively to cases already pending before the courts.
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Attorney General Janet Reno reversed that holding pursuant to her power to review BIA decisions 51 and held instead that AEDPA's 212(c) changes applied retroactively as well. 52 Basing her opinion on the retroactivity framework of Landgraf, the Attorney General held that applying AEDPA's restrictions to immigrants already convicted of their crimes did not have an impermissible retroactive effect because (1) the decision of whether to grant a 212(c) waiver of deportation was a question of prospective relief, and "[p]ast conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent's right to remain in the U.S."; 53 and (2) AEDPA only changed jurisdictional aspects of 212(c) relief-i.e., who was eligible to apply for relief, which is purely discretionary-rather than any substantive right to receive the relief. The Attorney General held that removal of a merely discretionary opportunity, as opposed to a vested right, did not create a retroactive effect.
54
The Attorney General's cramped interpretation, which was rejected in full by the Supreme Court in St. Cyr (2001) . The Second Circuit discussed the complexity of the split among the circuits, noting that the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits adopted the INS view that AEDPA's limitations on 212(c) eligibility did apply to preenactment convictions; the First and Ninth Circuits held that AEDPA's limitations did not apply to immigrants who can show they pleaded guilty in reliance on the availability of 212(c) relief; the Fourth Circuit adopted a blanket rule that AEDPA's limitations did not apply to any immigrant whose conviction was based on a guilty plea; and the Seventh Circuit held that AEDPA's limitations applied to pre-enactment guilty pleas, unless an immigrant "had conceded deportability, despite a colorable defense" in reliance on the availability of the 212(c) waiver. Fundamentally, retroactivity analysis in the civil context is a question of statutory construction, with a strong presumption against retroactive application. A civil statute applies retroactively only where the statute itself clearly so requires; if the statute is silent on the question of temporal scope, then the new law will only be applied prospectively. 59 In the immigration context, however, many lower courts have incorrectly introduced a subjective reliance requirement into this analysis. This is inconsistent with how statutory construction and the presumption against retroactivity work. Once a court determines that the scope of a statute is not expressly retroactive as to a class of people-i.e., people who undertook a certain conduct before enactment of the new law-then that entire class is protected from the new law by the presumption against retroactivity. To require proof of subjective reliance is to engage in judicial legislation; the court is choosing to apply a statute retroactively to certain individuals, even though the statute does not expressly mandate such application as to the entire class.
A. The Framework for Retroactivity Analysis
Retroactivity has been disfavored since the founding of the American legal system. In the civil context, this disfavor is embodied in the Landgraf decision and is expressly required in the immigration context by St. Cyr. 58 The most widely cited justification for this holding is one sentence of unsupported dicta from LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041. "It would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have decided not to commit drug crimes, or might have resisted conviction more vigorously, had they known that . . . when their prison term ended, [if] ordered deported, they could not ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation." Id. See infra Part III.A for a detailed discussion of this issue.
59 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286-87 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (" [T] here exists a judicial presumption, of great antiquity, that a legislative enactment affecting substantive rights does not apply retroactively absent clear statement to the contrary.").
The Historical Roots of Retroactivity
The notion that the government should not retroactively attach new legal consequences to past acts was a central founding legal principle of the United States, with roots in English common law and earlier Roman law, and has persisted as a broad and settled principle of modern jurisprudence.
60
Retroactivity is constitutionally impermissible in the criminal context under the Ex Post Facto Clause 61 and is heavily disfavored in the civil context.
62
Opposition to retroactive rulemaking was of great importance to the Framers of the Constitution. 63 Professor Natelson suggests that the issue of retroactivity was "central to the constitutional bargain" and that the Federalists were staunch advocates for including a ban on retroactivity in the Constitution. 62 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272 ("[W]hile the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule.").
63 See Natelson, supra note 60, at 491-94 (noting the centrality of retroactivity issues to the framing of the Constitution). 64 See id. at 492-93. Natelson argues that the Federalists compromised on the issue of retroactivity in order to obtain ratification. Id. at 527. While many Federalists thought the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply in both criminal and civil contexts, they Justice Story, sitting on the Circuit Court of New Hampshire in Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, articulated his influential definition of retroactivity, which the Landgraf Court adopted:
65 "Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective." 66 The serious policy concerns presented by retroactive laws are obvious and oft-repeated. These include a fear of government abuse, 67 upsetting settled expectations of individuals and groups, 68 the danger of using retroactive laws to injure unpopular groups, 69 and predictability concerns. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269. The Landgraf opinion collects several iterations of the definition of a retroactive law, including a law that "changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date," id. at 269 n.23 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981)); one that gives "a quality or effect to acts or conduct which they did not have or did not contemplate when they were performed," id. (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913) ); and one that "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability," id. (quoting Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1884)). Note that the terms "retrospective" and "retroactive" are used interchangeably in retroactivity jurisprudence. 67 See, e.g., Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 (suggesting that the Ex Post Facto Clause "restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation"). 68 See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 ("Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted."); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions."). it is well-established that a deportation proceeding for a convicted immigrant is not a criminal penalty but a civil procedure to determine the right to remain in the country (citing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594)). However, persuasive arguments have been made that deportation based on a criminal conviction is clearly punishment, and so should be subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause's restrictions. Third Circuit Judge Sarokin wrote the following:
Facto Clause does not directly govern questions of retroactivity and deportation, including the repeal of 212(c) relief. Nevertheless, decisions regarding retroactivity in the civil context routinely cite to Ex Post Facto Clause cases as persuasive authority, 74 because the Clause demonstrates the general disdain our system has for retroactive laws.
Landgraf and Its Progeny
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court provided the modern framework for analysis of retroactivity questions in the civil context. 75 Landgraf 's two-part test is fundamentally a rule of statutory construction with a strong presumption against retroactivity, unless Congress has expressly mandated otherwise. 76 Landgraf 's test does not include an individualized assessment of whether a particular defendant has relied on the prior state of the law or whether any unfairness would result from a retroactive application in her particular case. Fairness and reliance are only important in that they are the reason for the presumption against retroactivity; unless Congress expressly requires a retroactive application of the statute, the courts presume that Congress did not intend to act unfairly by applying a law retroactively to a class of people who acted before the new law took effect.
The legal fiction that deportation following a criminal conviction is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with reality, especially in the context of this case. Mr. Scheidemann entered this country at age twelve; he has lived here for thirty-six years; he has been married to an American citizen for twenty-four years; he has raised three children all of whom are American citizens; his elderly parents are naturalized citizens; two of his four siblings are naturalized American citizens, and all four of them reside permanently in the United States; he has no ties to Colombia, the country to which he is to be deported; and he has fully served the sentence imposed upon him. It is helpful to understand the facts of Landgraf. The case arose out of a sexual harassment and retaliation suit against Ms. Landgraf's employer, USI Film Products. 77 The district court found that she had been sexually harassed, but that the harassment was not sufficiently severe to justify her decision to quit. 78 Therefore, her termination did not violate Title VII, and she was not eligible for equitable relief in the form of back pay. 79 At the time of the district court decision, Title VII only authorized equitable relief, leading the trial court to dismiss her action despite its finding that she had been sexually harassed. 80 However, while Landgraf's appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed into law. 81 The new Civil Rights Act allowed plaintiffs who proved harassment to recover compensatory and punitive damages as well, and permitted any party to request a jury trial if damages were claimed. 82 Based on this new provision, Landgraf argued on appeal that her case should be remanded to the trial court for a jury trial on damages. 83 The Supreme Court held, in an 8-1 decision, 84 that applying the new damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct (the sexual harassment) that occurred before the effective date of the law, would be impermissibly retroactive, given that Congress did not explicitly state that the damages provision should be applied retroactively. 85 The Court reached this conclusion by applying a two-part test. 86 Step one asks "whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach."
87 If Congress made the statute's scope expressly retroactive, then it must be applied retroactively, and there is "no need to 77 Id. at 248. 78 89 If the statute would impose new legal consequences on past acts, then the "traditional presumption" against retroactive application without "clear congressional intent" would prohibit the retroactive effect. 90 The Landgraf test is, thus, one of statutory construction with a strong presumption against retroactivity, absent a statement by Congress expressly prescribing the statute's temporal reach. A civil statute may be made retroactive by Congress if it so desires, because the Ex Post Facto Clause is not a bar in the civil context. 91 However, absent a clear showing that the statute's scope extends to past acts, the presumption against retroactivity will void any such application of the law. The courts' role is to faithfully implement the law as written by Congress, be it retroactive or prospective, and where the scope of the statute is unclear, a court may only permit prospective application, because of the strong disfavor for retroactive laws.
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The Landgraf two-part test is only concerned with statutory construction (i.e., what is the scope of the statute and to which class does this statute apply?) rather than with considerations of fairness or reliance by individual parties. The Court's decision in Landgraf did not rest on the effects of the statute as applied to the facts of that particu- 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 See id. at 266 n.19 (noting the inapplicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to anything other than "penal legislation"). Presumably, the Due Process Clause would place some sort of limitation on the freedom Congress has to apply consequences retroactively in the civil context. See Morawetz, supra note 73, at 160-61 (suggesting that the Due Process Clause is an independent limit to retroactivity). 92 The Court notes that its presumption against retroactivity in the civil context is soundly rooted in a "long line of cases" that "span two centuries," including Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, whose straightforward rule the Court cites approvingly: "[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ). The Court also notes that the jurisprudence that supports the antiretroactivity presumption has largely, but not exclusively, involved provisions "affecting contractual or property rights." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 271. Indeed, the Court highlights an early Chinese immigration case, Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559 (1884), as an example of the presumption's use outside the commercial context. lar case. The presumption against retroactivity means that once it is theoretically possible that the reliance interest of any member of a class could be upset by application of the statute (i.e., that there is a retroactive effect), then the statute is read to exclude every member of that class.
"Fairness" is only a component of the analysis insofar as it is the basis for the presumption against retroactivity. 93 Congress is permitted to be "unfair" by crafting explicitly retroactive laws if it so decides; but if Congress does not clearly mandate retroactivity, the Court will presume the statute does not retroactively add legal consequences to past acts, because the Court presumes that Congress does not act in an unfair manner without explicitly saying it is doing so.
Indeed, the Landgraf Court rightly noted that concerns about "lack of fair notice," "suspect legislative purpose," and "fairness" were "muted" on the particular facts of the case because sexual harassment was legally proscribed at the time the harassment occurred.
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Even though fairness to the employer, USI Film, was not a concern, a retroactive effect was still not permissible. Clearly then, the Court's decision was not based on an individualized consideration of fairness.
The same is true in the Supreme Court's next important civil retroactivity decision, Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer.
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In a unanimous decision, the Hughes Court fully adopted 93 As the Landgraf Court stated: Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits. Such a requirement allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving legislators a predictable background rule against which to legislate. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73. The Court is equally clear when it notes that "[t]he presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact." Id. at 270. 94 Id. at 282. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had already made sexual harassment unlawful; sexual harassment discrimination was already subject to monetary liability (back pay) under the 1964 version of the Act. Id. Further, compensatory damages do not "smack of a 'retributive' or other suspect legislative purpose" because they seek to make the victim whole. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that compensatory damages are "not in a category in which objections to retroactive application on grounds of fairness have their greatest force." Id. Yet, despite this muted concern with fairness, the Court still found that application of the amended Act's compensatory damages provision to conduct occurring before enactment of the statute was retroactive because it would "affect[] the liabilities of defendants," would have "an impact on private parties' planning," and would "attach an important new legal burden to that conduct. The Hughes Court used the same test for retroactive effect set out in Landgraf: whether new legal consequences have been attached to past conduct. 100 against retroactive legislation, calling it a "time-honored presumption" to be applied "unless Congress has clearly manifested its intent to the contrary." Id. at 946. The decision is notable because it is unanimous, quite short, and absolutely embraces the crystal clear rules of statutory construction set out in Landgraf, a clarity that is lost in the lower court decisions on 212(c) retroactivity. Landgraf two-step analysis and determined that (1) there was no indication that Congress intended the amended provision to apply retroactively, id., and (2) Contrary to lower courts' interpretation, the Court here has not set up an individualized, as-applied test for retroactive effect, but merely offers lower courts signposts for detecting when a retroactive effect as to an entire class has occurred. If applying a new rule to a past act has the potential of operating in an unfair way as to members of a class (i.e., defendants who committed their act prior to the new law) then the statute creates a retroactive effect. There is no requirement 190, 199 (1913) (noting that a retroactive statute gives "a quality or effect to acts or conduct which they did not have or did not contemplate when they were performed"). Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268-69. The Landgraf Court phrases the definition in this way: a statute is retroactive if it "would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id. at 280.
102 See, e.g., Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (asking whether "the petitioners chose to go to trial in reliance on the availability of § 212(c) relief").
103 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270 ("Any test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity.").
for an individual member of that class to prove that she would suffer an unfairness were the new law to be applied to her in particular.
In the 212(c) context, some lower courts have held that the illegality of the prior act is sufficient notice to preclude a later finding of retroactive effect. 106 However, both Landgraf and Hughes make clear that this reasoning is incorrect. 107 Actual notice that some behavior is proscribed and illegal, and so carries with it criminal and civil consequences, is irrelevant to the question of whether the new law attaches new legal consequences to past acts. Just because an act is proscribed does not mean that the penalty for that act can be increased retroactively.
The only dispositive test for retroactive effect under Landgraf and its progeny is not fairness or reliance by individual parties, but whether new legal consequences have been attached to the past conduct of a class of litigants. The Landgraf rule is crystal clear; unfortunately, the analysis by some lower courts on this issue in the 212(c) context, has been less so. 107 See Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947-48 (1997) (holding that the illegality of the act-submission of a false claim to the government-is not relevant to the question of whether a retroactive effect has occurred); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283 n.35 (noting that even if conduct is "morally reprehensible or illegal," the presumption against retroactivity still applies when the law "imposes additional burdens based on conduct that occurred in the past"). 108 Cyr without the opportunity to apply for the waiver of deportation to which the Supreme Court later determined they were entitled. At its most basic, the portion of the St. Cyr decision devoted to retroactivity held that Mr. St. Cyr, who pleaded guilty to his crime before repeal of 212(c) relief, was still entitled to apply for a waiver of deportation. 110 The St. Cyr decision begins by easily rejecting the two highly formalistic reasons given by the Justice Department and many lower courts for refusing to fully apply Landgraf to the immigration context. 111 First, the Court held that just because deportation proceedings concern a future sanction does not mean that deportation cannot have a retroactive effect. 112 Cyr, a citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986, and pleaded guilty ten years later to a charge of selling a controlled substance, a violation of Connecticut law. Id. at 293. While this conviction made him subject to deportation, the AEDPA was not yet law at the time of his guilty plea, so he was eligible at the time of his plea to apply for 212(c) relief from deportation. Id. The INS began removal proceedings against St. Cyr on April 10, 1997, by which time both AEDPA and IIRIRA had become law. Id. The government argued that under the new statutes the Attorney General no longer had authority to consider 212(c) relief for St. Cyr, because his crime was an "aggravated felony" under the terms of the new laws. Id. at 297. The decision also included a highly contentious threshold question, namely whether despite AEDPA and IIRIRA's limits on habeas review of final orders of removal, federal district courts retained jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions. Id. at 309. The court held that it did. Id. at 314. 111 Id. at 324-25. These two arguments were (1) that the power to grant relief from deportation is an inherently prospective exercise; and (2) that immigrants who previously could apply for 212(c) were not guaranteed to actually win relief from deportation, because the relief was discretionary only; hence, removal of the ability to apply for relief does not amount to the impairment of a right. See In re Soriano, No. 3289, 1997 WL 33347804 (Att'y Gen. Feb. 21, 1997) (reporting a decision by Attorney General Reno that reversed a BIA opinion holding that the repeal of 212(c) was not retroactive).
112 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324 (holding that even though deportation is a prospective undertaking, rather than punishment for a past criminal act, it can still be carried out in a way that is retroactive as to that act). The Court held in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984) , that deportation is prospective in the sense that it de-the claim, made by Attorney General Reno and many lower courts, that removal of discretionary relief does not constitute impairment of a right: "There is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation." 113 The St. Cyr decision is important in three respects: (1) it mandates full application of the Landgraf framework to retroactivity questions in the immigration context; (2) like Landgraf and its progeny, it does not employ a subjective reliance test as part of step two of the analysis; and (3) it does not limit its decision to the facts of Mr. St. Cyr's case, that is to the context of an accepted plea bargain. Each issue is considered in turn below.
First, St. Cyr holds that the Court's well-established retroactivity jurisprudence, embodied in Landgraf and its progeny, applies as fully in the immigration context as in any other. 114 Applying step one of the Landgraf analysis, the Court concluded that Congress did not clearly mandate the temporal reach of IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) relief, and therefore the presumption against retroactivity meant the statute could not be applied in a way that caused a retroactive effect. 115 Second, the Court does not employ an individualized assessment under step two of the Landgraf test. To determine whether the statute would cause a retroactive effect, the Court employs the classic Landgraf test: whether the new law would attach new legal consequences to termines whether an immigrant will retain the right to remain in the United States, rather than punishing an immigrant for past bad acts. However, the Court only held that deportation was prospective as a way of concluding that deportation is not subject to the procedural protections of the criminal system. Id.; see also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324 ("[W]e have [so held] in order to reject the argument that . . . deportation proceedings are therefore subject to the 'various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial.'" (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038)).
113 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325. 114 See id. at 325 n.55 (asserting that just because Congress has the power to alter rights of permanent residents retroactively does not mean that the Court will not require Congress to "make its intention plain," as Landgraf mandates); see also Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 491 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he Court made plain in St. Cyr that the retroactive application of an immigration law is analyzed no differently from the retroactive application of any other civil statute." (citation omitted)). St. Cyr's holding put to rest the persistent argument that because immigrants are here at the "grace" of the Attorney General, laws pertaining to them do not need to follow settled retroactivity principles. 115 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (concluding that there was no evidence that Congress had "affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272-73 (1994))). past conduct. 116 The Court did not ask whether Mr. St. Cyr, as an individual, would suffer a retroactive effect, but whether the class of immigrants who pleaded guilty to their crimes prior to the repeal of 212(c) could, hypothetically, suffer a retroactive effect.
117
The Court makes this inquiry because if any member of the larger class runs a hypothetical risk of having her expectations upset, then applying the new law to the past conduct of any class members would amount to the attachment of new legal consequences to past acts. 118 This does not, however, mean that subjective individual reliance or actual class reliance is required. Under St. Cyr, as under Landgraf, the only test for retroactive effect is whether new legal consequences would be attached to past acts. 119 The Court concludes that because plea agreements involve a quid pro quo exchange between defendants and the government, it is hypothetically possible (and even probable) that an immigrant defendant in that situation would consider the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. 116 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 (explaining the second step of the analysis and citing to Landgraf for the standard). 117 The Court asks whether a retroactive effect would be caused by applying the new to law to "aliens who, like respondent, were convicted pursuant to a plea agreement at a time when their plea would not have rendered them ineligible for § 212(c) relief." Id. at 320. The Third and Fourth Circuits have also recognized that St. Cyr establishes no subjective reliance test for a retroactive effect. See Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e hold that reliance (whether subjective or objective) is not a requirement of impermissible retroactivity . . . ."); Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 493 ("And indeed the Court's holding is not limited to those aliens who actually relied on the availability of § 212(c) relief . . . ."). In fact, Enrico St. Cyr himself did not negotiate a plea deal that absolutely guaranteed he would be eligible for 212(c) relief under the pre-1996 law, because his deal imposed a ten-year sentence, with suspension of that sentence after five years. See Brief for the Petitioner at 11 n.7, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-767) (explaining the deal offered to Mr. St. Cyr). As the Third Circuit noted, if Mr. St. Cyr had actually served the entire five year sentence, under the pre-1996 law he would have been ineligible to apply for deportation relief under 212(c). See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 493 n.11 (noting that the pre-1996 INA denied 212(c) relief to immigrants who served a term of imprisonment of at least five years). 118 As the Landgraf Court noted, "[t]he presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. 119 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (repeating Landgraf 's formulation and Justice Story's definition of retroactivity). 120 The Court notes the following: Now that prosecutors have received the benefit of these plea agreements, agreements that were likely facilitated by the aliens' belief in their continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief, it would surely be contrary to "familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations" to hold that IIRIRA's subsequent restrictions deprive them of any possibility of such relief. Id. at 323-24 (citation omitted) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). Note that the Third, the St. Cyr decision does not limit its holding to the facts of the case, that is, to the context of an accepted plea bargain. The decision does discuss the specific reasons that the class of immigrants who accepted a plea deal could have hypothetically relied on the availability of 212(c) relief, thereby creating an impermissible retroactive effect. 121 In summary, the flawed analysis that plagued 212(c) jurisprudence from Soriano until St. Cyr was based on the notion that immigration was somehow excused from normal retroactivity considerations. St. Cyr's major contribution was to correct this misperception. HowCourt here speaks only about a hypothetical immigrant within the class of immigrants who pleaded guilty to their crimes prior to repeal of 212(c) relief. 121 Id. The Rankine court adopted a faulty framework to decide whether an impermissible retroactive effect would occur by asking whether "the petitioners chose to go to trial in reliance on the availability of § 212(c) relief."
128 This test improperly inquires into the subjective behavior of the parties rather than addressing whether the law would theoretically attach new legal consequences to the past acts of the class, as required by Landgraf. The second error in Rankine is that the court confined St. Cyr to its facts, namely the accepted plea bargain context, by distinguishing the acceptance of a plea bargain from the decision to go to trial. 129 Third, the Rankine decision improperly shifts the burden of proof by turning the presumption against retroactivity into a protection that must be earned by the party that invokes it. Instead of the presumption governing the scope of the statute as to an entire class of immi-grants, as Landgraf requires, the Rankine court asked whether one particular member of that class has earned the right to be protected by the presumption. 130 The "timeless and universal human appeal" 131 of the antiretroactivity presumption is that it protects the people from government overreaching, honors a basic understanding about how the law works, protects groups from unfair targeting, and provides predictability. 132 The purpose of the presumption is to protect classes of people from unfairness, a goal that would be undermined by requiring that individuals within that class do something to earn the right to be protected. The Fourth Circuit decision, though it addressed a 130 Indeed, the opinion does not once use the word "presumption" even though the presumption against retroactivity is at the very heart of this analysis. See Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 489 n.6 (3d. Cir. 2004) (noting that the word "presumption" is used only one time in Rankine, and that it only appears incidentally "in an extended quotation of another Court of Appeals' decision"). 131 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the longstanding principle that conduct should be adjudicated under the laws in effect at the time of the conduct).
132 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (noting the policy concerns that animate the opposition to retroactive laws). 133 13))). IIRIRA replaced the term "entry" with "admission" and applied IIRIRA to residents convicted of aggravated felonies who applied for "admission" when returning from brief trips abroad. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §301(a), 110 Stat. 546, 575 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)) (defining "admission" to include permanent residents who different provision of IIRIRA, is remarkable for its spot-on treatment of the reliance question.
The Third Circuit's Decision: Ponnapula
The Third Circuit decision in Ponnapula offers an excellent rebuttal to the flawed post-St. Cyr thinking epitomized by the Rankine decision. The decision does three important things: (1) it takes statutory construction and the presumption against retroactivity as its starting point; (2) it challenges the Rankine claim that actual reliance is a prerequisite for applying the presumption against retroactivity in an individual case; and (3) it does not confine St. Cyr to the context of an accepted plea bargain.
Ponnapula involves a permanent resident who was a relatively minor (and perhaps completely unwitting) participant in a fraudulent loan application scheme.
135
At the time of his trial he was offered a misdemeanor plea deal, but rejected it with the hope of being acquitted at trial, and also with the knowledge that 212(c) would be available to him should he be convicted.
136
After his conviction, IIRIRA was enacted, which the government argued made him automatically deportable.
The Ponnapula court begins its analysis where Landgraf says it should, with statutory construction.
137
Because Congress did not expressly mandate a retroactive repeal of 212(c), the court correctly notes that Landgraf established a "presumption against statutory retroactivity."
138
This starting point is a significant improvement over Rankine, which failed to even mention the existence of this presumption. 139 commit crimes of moral turpitude or drug offenses, travel abroad, and seek to return). When Mr. Olatunji returned from a nine-day trip to London, he disclosed his pre-IIRIRA conviction, and the government deemed him an alien seeking admission under IIRIRA, which subjected him to removal proceedings. See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 386 (detailing the procedural aspects of Olatunji's case).
135 See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 485 (noting the trial judge's finding that "petitioner's counsel has convinced me that his client was, for lack of a better term, the small fry or-maybe even better term-the schnook of this particular group of miscreants"). 136 Id. at 484. 137 See id. at 490 ("[I]n the absence of a clear command, a consistent line of cases establishes that 'congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect.'" (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994))). 138 Id. at 482 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). 139 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that Rankine does not discuss Second, after noting that the correct test under step two of Landgraf is to ask whether the new law "attaches new legal consequences to prior events,"
140 Ponnapula challenges Rankine's claim that the test for retroactive effect also requires proof of actual reliance.
141
Reviewing the facts and holdings of Landgraf, Hughes, Martin, and St. Cyr, the court concludes that none of these cases require actual reliance by the party in order to benefit from the presumption against retroactivity. Ponnapula rightly criticizes Rankine for its "subtle heightening of the showing required to trigger the presumption against retroactivity." 142 That said, Ponnapula does not reject reliance completely. Rather, the court concludes, based largely on Martin and St. Cyr, that the Supreme Court has adopted a "reasonable reliance" requirement as to the group or class of people "to whose conduct the statute is addressed." 143 But, arguably, the distinction between requiring reasonable reliance and requiring no reliance at all is meaningless. The Fourth Circuit in Olatunji makes this argument quite convincingly:
[W]e must admit that it is unclear to us in what circumstance, if any, the "reasonable reliance" inquiry will (or at least should) yield a conclusion different from that reached under Justice Story's framework. For it would seem never to be unreasonable for one to rely upon a duly enacted or promulgated law.
144
While Ponnapula correctly rejects Rankine's requirement of actual reliance, the court muddies that clear conclusion by discussing Mr. Ponnapula's "reasonable reliance." 145 Because it is always reasonable the presumption). 140 Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 482-83. 141 Ponnapula correctly questions Rankine's focus on "the particular facts and circumstances of the party before the court." Id. at 491. " [T] he Second Circuit seems to require a quantum of evidence regarding the subjective intent of the party seeking to avoid retroactive application; this too strikes us as being in tension with the language of presumption in Landgraf and its progeny . . . ." Id. 142 Id. at 491. 143 Id. at 493. 144 Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 383, 396 (4th Cir. 2004). 145 For example, the Ponnapula court correctly emphasizes that the Supreme Court decided Landgraf and Hughes without reference to reliance by the parties or even the class:
[I]t is unlikely that in Landgraf any employer demonstrably relied on the absence of a punitive damages remedy for Title VII violations, or that in Hughes Aircraft any government contractor purposely arranged its billing practices ex ante to take advantage of a specific defense under the False Claims Act. Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 493. Yet, having found that reliance was not a factor in either of these cases, the court nonetheless evaluates Mr. Ponnapula's situation in terms of his reliance. For example, the court says:
to rely on the current state of the law, "reasonable reliance," can really only mean that a court applies the law as it existed at the time of the act. Thus, Ponnapula's holding is an affirmation of Landgraf 's lack of a reliance requirement and a rejection of Rankine. But this clarity is undermined by the reliance language that the court uses. The Ponnapula analysis would be clearer if the language of "reasonable reliance" were substituted with a holding that no reliance at all is required to show retroactive effect.
146
This is the conclusion that Olatunji reaches. Ponnapula concludes that this is not so: "St. Cyr is simply one application of the general principles articulated in Landgraf that counsel against interpreting statutes to have retroactive effect."
149 Because St. Cyr gives one example of the way IIRIRA can attach new legal consequences to past acts, rather than giving the only way, the Ponnapula court is able to find an impermissible retroactive effect in a non-plea-bargain context. This case may seem harder [than Landgraf and its progeny] because making the decision to go to trial is perhaps more complex and more nuanced, but we should not let that obscure the fact that former § 212(c) was one of a host of factors considered by aliens who elected that course . . . . Id. at 495. 146 One of the problems created by Ponnapula's use of the empty phrase "reasonable reliance" is that it sounds as though the court's no-reliance holding is limited by a reasonable reliance standard, when it really is not (because "reasonable reliance" can only mean reliance on the state of the law at the time of the conduct, which is the same as a no-reliance standard). The confusion created by this muddying manifests itself in the court's statement that it "highly doubt[s]" that immigrants who "went to trial because they were not offered a plea agreement" have a "reliance interest that renders IIRIRA's repeal of former § 212(c) impermissibly retroactive as to them." Id. at 494. By suggesting that the court's holding does not apply to immigrants who were not offered a plea agreement because they lack a reliance interest, the court implies that its holding requires a showing of reliance, even though it arguably holds just the opposite of that.
147 See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 394 ("In sum, the historical presumption against retroactive application of statutes did not require reliance. Neither Landgraf nor subsequent Supreme Court authority imposes any such requirement.").
148 Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 488. 149 Id. at 483.
The Fourth Circuit's Decision: Olatunji
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of reliance in Olatunji v. Ashcroft provides an antidote to the confusion surrounding reliance in retroactivity analysis. 150 The decision cuts through the chaff of previous decisions by flatly stating that reliance is not required for a finding of impermissible retroactive effect. 151 The decision represents a fulfillment of one of St. Cyr's most important pronouncements-that retroactivity analysis is applied the same way in the immigration context as it is in any other area of civil law.
152
The Olatunji case concerned a parallel IIRIRA provision that changed the rule for when permanent residents with criminal convictions were deemed admissible to the United States after returning from brief trips abroad.
153
The respondent in the case, having pleaded guilty years earlier to one count of theft, was denied admission into the U.S. after a nine-day trip abroad, based on IIRIRA's redefinition of admissibility. 154 The issue in the case was one of retroactivity: was an impermissible retroactive effect created by attaching new legal consequences (deportation) to a prior act (his crime and guilty plea)?
The Olatunji decision correctly calls cases like Rankine "nothing but judicial legislation," because they permit the retroactive application of a statute even though Congress did not mandate such retroactivity.
155
Instead of adopting Rankine's flawed reasoning, Olatunji be-150 387 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2004). 151 Id. at 388. 152 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining that St. Cyr rejected lower court decisions holding that retroactivity analysis functioned differently in the immigration context).
153 See supra note 134 and accompanying text for further explanation of the legal provisions at issue in Olatunji. 154 The basic facts of Olatunji are as follows: Clifford K. Olatunji, a citizen of Nigeria, pleaded guilty in 1994 (pre-IIRIRA) to one count of theft of government property and was sentenced to two months at a community treatment center, a $259 fine, a $2,296 payment of restitution, and probation for two years. In 1998, after the enactment of IIRIRA, Mr. Olatunji took a nine-day trip to London. When he returned to the United States, he disclosed his conviction, which led the INS to classify him, according to IIRIRA, as a permanent resident seeking admission to the United States. Due to his conviction, he was deemed inadmissible under IIRIRA and was ordered deported. Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 386. 155 See id. at 394 (" [W] here Congress has apparently given no thought to . . . retroactivity whatever, there is no basis for inferring that Congress' intent was any more nuanced than that statutes should not be held to apply retroactively. Anything more, in the face of complete congressional silence, is nothing but judicial legislation.").
gins its analysis with the retroactivity framework of Landgraf, namely statutory construction and the presumption against retroactivity.
156
Directly rebutting the Rankine line of cases, Olatunji holds that "reliance (whether subjective or objective) is not a requirement of impermissible retroactivity."
157 At most, the court says a "reasonable reliance" standard-à la Ponnapula-may be required; 158 however, the Olatunji court views that as an empty requirement, given that it is always reasonable to rely on a "duly promulgated" law. 159 The court notes that the Supreme Court's treatment of reliance has been "confusing . . . beginning in Landgraf and continuing through St. Cyr."
160
But after reviewing those cases, 161 the court concludes that none established an actual reliance requirement.
162
Requiring reliance, the Olatunji court argues, would not be in keeping with the logic of the presumption against retroactivity: 156 See id. at 389 ("Retroactivity is a question of congressional intent."). 157 Id. at 388. 158 See id. at 389 ("If some form of reliance were understood as required by the Supreme Court's teachings on the subject, it could only be objectively reasonable reliance."). 159 See id. at 396 ("For it would seem never to be unreasonable for one to rely upon a duly enacted as promulgated law."). 160 Id. at 389. Olatunji also calls Landgraf 's treatment of reliance "ambiguous." Id. at 390. This may be a bit of a false characterization, because the Landgraf Court forthrightly stated that fairness and reliance were not the basis for its decision. The Court found an impermissible retroactive effect because the compensatory damages "attach[ed] an important new legal burden to [the past] conduct," even though concerns about fairness and reliance were "muted." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 283 (1994). Therefore, Landgraf cannot be read to require any showing of reliance. The ambiguity of the Landgraf decision that the Olatunji court laments has been created by later interpretations of the decision, and particularly a misinterpretation of the "familiar considerations" phrase. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (arguing that the circuit courts have rendered Landgraf's holding ambiguous by misreading one sentence of the Court's opinion). 161 The Olatunji court's review of cases 162 See Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 394 ("In sum, the historical presumption against retroactive application of statutes did not require reliance. Neither Landgraf nor subsequent Supreme Court authority imposes any such requirement. And we believe that the consideration of reliance is irrelevant to statutory retroactivity analysis."). The Ponnapula decision came to this same conclusion. See Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 489 (" [T] he Supreme Court has never required actual reliance in any case in the Landgraf line.").
"[S]ubjective reliance . . . is neither dictated by Supreme Court precedent nor related to the presumption of congressional intent underlying the bar against retroactivity."
163
As Olatunji noted, retroactivity analysis is based on a statutory construction inquiry into the prescribed scope of the statute; once the scope is determined as to a class, the subjective behaviors of individual members of that class do not matter:
It is one thing to indulge in the supportable presumption that Congress intends its enactments not to operate retroactively; it is another altogether to indulge the quite different, and unsupported and unsupportable, presumption that Congress so intends, but only where the particular petitioning party can prove that he subjectively relied on the prior statement to his detriment.
164
Olatunji highlights the way in which Landgraf and retroactivity analysis generally are based on the notion of a separation of powers. Congress, not the courts, is the proper body to determine what is fair and unfair in terms of civil retroactivity, and whether unfairness is a worthy price to pay in order to accomplish other policy goals. 165 If Congress has not mandated retroactive application, the courts cannot invade Congress' territory by judicially legislating a potentially unfair result. Only Congress can make that choice. Therefore, litigants, commentators, and courts confronted with civil retroactivity questions should focus on Landgraf 's two-part test of statutory construction, rather than the legally irrelevant issues of individual fairness and notice. 166 Unfairness arguments should be made to Congress, not the 163 Olatunji, 387 F.3d at 389. 164 Id. at 394. 165 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (looking first to Congress for determination of policy). 166 For example, Mr. Ponnapula's story is incredibly sympathetic-he was a "small fry" in the criminal endeavor, taken advantage of by his brother; his crime was filing a false loan application; he had lived in the U.S. for many years and had a wife and children who were U.S. citizens; and he was at the very final stages of becoming a U.S. citizen, with just the oath left to be administered, when he was indicted. Ponnapula, 373 F.3d at 483-86. But suppose that none of that were true, and Mr. Ponnapula were actually an unsavory character who committed a violent crime. If he had turned down a plea deal, proceeded to trial, and received a sentence of less than five years he would still be eligible for 212(c) relief under the Olatunji holding and protected from retroactive application of IIRIRA, not because he deserved any special considerations because he was a good person, or because taking away 212(c) relief seemed "unfair," but simply because IIRIRA would attach new legal consequences to his previous act of rejecting the plea and proceeding to trial. courts, in this area of the law. Once Congress decides the temporal scope of a civil statute, the Courts must faithfully apply it.
167
III. THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME IS THE RELEVANT ACT FOR DETERMINING THE RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF 212(C)'S REPEAL Given the Supreme Court's retroactivity framework, the commission of the crime should be the relevant act for considering whether application of IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) is retroactive. Under such an analysis, if an immigrant committed her crime prior to passage of IIRIRA, she would still have access to 212(c) relief; if she committed the crime after IIRIRA's passage, she would not be eligible to apply for a waiver. To date, no circuit court has reached this conclusion.
In evaluating the question of whether the commission of the crime is the relevant past act for retroactivity purposes, no circuit court has rigorously applied the Supreme Court's retroactivity framework. Instead, the courts have rejected the argument out of hand by citing unsupported dicta from a Seventh Circuit decision that was issued prior to St. Cyr. 168 This refusal to seriously examine the requirements of Landgraf and its progeny shows a continued reluctance to follow St. Cyr's command to apply retroactivity analysis uniformly across all areas of law, including the immigration context.
A. The Circuit Courts Have Wrongly Rejected the Commission-of-the-Crime Argument
The circuit courts have rejected the argument that the commission of the crime is the relevant act for determining retroactive effect on two grounds. First, courts have said that the conviction, not the underlying commission of the crime, is what renders the immigrant ineligible for 212(c) relief under IIRIRA. tion, not the commission of the crime is the relevant act for retroactivity purposes.
170
The second argument, actually more of a bald assertion offered with little explanation or support, is that criminals do not consider the immigration consequences of their crimes at the time of commission; therefore, the commission of the crime is not the proper point for retroactivity analysis. The most widely quoted version of this assertion comes from dicta in LaGuerre v. Reno, 171 a pre-St. Cyr case from the Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner wrote for the court:
It would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have decided not to commit drug crimes, or might have resisted conviction more vigorously, had they known that if they were not only imprisoned but also, when their prison term ended, ordered deported, they could not ask for a discretionary waiver of deportation.
172
Despite the fact that this dicta goes unexplained in LaGuerre, the statement has proven attractive to numerous courts.
173 Decisions citing to LaGuerre's dicta as a shorthand way of rejecting a commission-170 Judge Gleeson, a district court judge in the Second Circuit, vehemently disagreed with the logic of Domond, though he conceded he was required to follow the precedent:
I suggest that common sense requires a different point of reference for the retroactivity analysis. Few people would disagree with [petitioner's] assertion that he has been ordered deported because he committed a property crime, not because he was convicted of it a year later. of-the-crime claim usually fail to add any analytical meat to these very weak bones.
174
There are two fundamental problems with the Seventh Circuit's "absurdity" rationale. First, given the Supreme Court's acceptance in Landgraf that businesses undertake cost-benefit analyses regarding their legal obligations, 175 it is not absurd to imagine that immigrants might undertake a similar cost-benefit analysis before committing their own crimes.
Second, even if it is absurd that an immigrant would consider the immigration consequences of her criminal acts, the court is asking the wrong question. The issue for retroactivity analysis is not reliance on the state of the law at the time of the act, but whether the new law attaches new legal consequences to a past act. An immigrant's subjective consideration of the immigration consequences of her actions is not part of the retroactivity analysis-the immigrant does not have to prove she deserves the antiretroactivity presumption. It is therefore immaterial whether a subjective consideration is absurd or not.
Surprisingly, the LaGuerre dictum is embraced by the Third Circuit's decision in Ponnapula, even though Ponnapula rejects an actual 174 For example, Lara-Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 945, dismisses the argument in half a paragraph, by citing LaGuerre's dicta and scoffing that the applicant cannot "seriously maintain" that IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) "would upset his settled expectations sufficiently to trigger the presumption against retroactivity." The Lara-Ruiz court (1) relies solely on LaGuerre's dicta to reject the commission-of-crime argument, and (2) requires the immigrant to prove she deserves protection from the presumption against retroactivity, by proving that her expectations have been sufficiently upset to "trigger" protection of the presumption. The court is analytically superficial on the first count, and wrong on the second.
The Second Circuit offers only slightly more analysis in Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d at 102, and relies on the LaGuerre "absurd" dicta as the basis for rejecting the claim. The court wraps the language of reliance around its conclusion of absurdity, which brings the decision into direct conflict with the Supreme Court's lack of a reliance requirement. See id. at 103 ("Mohammed, who was convicted after section 212(c) relief became unavailable, has no basis for claiming similar reliance."). Reliance is the wrong test for retroactivity, and even if it were the right test, it would hardly be absurd for an immigrant to be concerned about the immigration consequences of her actions. It was not absurd for USI Film, in Landgraf, to be concerned about the damages consequences of sexual harassment suits; and it was not absurd for Hughes Aircraft to be concerned about the mechanisms in place that might allow a private individual to sue the company for filing false claims. It seems no more absurd for an immigrant to be concerned about the immigration consequences of her contemplated crime.
175 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 283 n.35 (1994) ("The new damages provisions of § 102 can be expected to give managers an added incentive to take preventive measures to ward off discriminatory conduct by subordinates before it occurs . . . .").
reliance requirement.
176 Ponnapula justifies its acceptance of LaGuerre by attempting to draw a distinction between an "attenuated reliance interest" like the one it finds in Landgraf and Hughes (i.e., it was unlikely that USI Film Products would be faced with a sexual harassment suit or that Hughes Aircraft would be faced with a false claims suit) and an attenuation "connoting causal remoteness," which the court finds in the case of an immigrant. 177 This attempt to distinguish the two cases is unconvincing. In each, the defendant is only vaguely aware of the potential consequences of its actions: USI Film did not know what kind of damages it faced if it were to commit sexual harassment; Hughes Aircraft was not aware of who could bring qui tam suits against it; and the immigrant might not be aware of exactly which crimes she can commit without risking the loss of a waiver of deportation. In addition, while many who commit crimes are aware that they will face legal and immigration consequences, it is also possible-as in Ponnapula-that they are such "small fries" in the operation that they are completely unaware that they will face criminal prosecution. This lack of awareness does not mean that retroactive consequences should be heaped upon such a person. Finally, Ponnapula's attempt to distinguish between different types of reliance contradicts that decision's core logic: that reliance is not a requirement for protection from retroactive laws.
B. Which Past Act Is Relevant for Retroactivity Analysis?
Step two of Landgraf asks whether new legal consequences would be attached to past acts. But which past acts are relevant for this retroactive effect analysis? Or, as Justice Scalia put the question in his concurrence in Martin v. Hadix, "retroactive in reference to what?" 178 Both Landgraf and Hughes easily identify the relevant past act as the defendant's commission of the illegal action, rather than the defendant's conviction. And both cases state that the illegality of the past act-and the fact that the defendant was thereby on constructive notice not to commit such an act-is irrelevant to the decision of which act should be chosen. In the context of 212(c), however, the holdings of Landgraf and Hughes have not been followed. Lower court decisions like Lara-Ruiz and Mohammed have held that an immigrant's 176 See Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 495, 496 n.14 (quoting the LaGuerre claim of absurdity to reject the commission-of-the-crime argument). 177 Id. at 496 n.14. 178 527 U.S. 343, 362 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).
conviction is the relevant point of consideration because it is the conviction that makes the immigrant subject to deportation.
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In Landgraf, the Court could have chosen one of two acts as the "relevant conduct" for the retroactive effect test: either the commission of sexual harrassment against Ms. Landgraf or the trial court's finding that USI Film was guilty of committing sexual harassment (Point A or B of Figure 1 ). The Court chose Point A, asking whether the new damages provisions would attach new legal consequences to the commission of sexual harassment.
180
The Court did not choose Point B, which would require asking whether new legal consequences would be attached to the court's finding that USI Film violated the law. One might defend the choice of Point B because USI Film was not liable for damages until after an adjudication that the company was legally responsible for the sexual harassment; but the Court does not even consider this possibility. 181 By not explaining why it chose A over B, the Court leaves the impression that the harassment was so obviously the relevant conduct that the question did not warrant discussion. Because Point A is the relevant act, even if USI Film was not held liable until after the new law took effect (see Figure 2 for this scenario), the new law would still cause an impermissible retroactive effect as applied to the wrongful conduct. In other words, because the unlawful conduct is the relevant point of analysis, it does not matter whether the defendant's liability attaches before or after the change in the law. The Landgraf decision also rejected the plaintiff's argument that because intentional employment discrimination was illegal at the time of USI Film's conduct, attaching new damage consequences to these acts was not a retroactive penalty. The Court noted that just because the underlying conduct is "morally reprehensible or illegal," and the defendant should be on notice not to behave this way, that does not mean that unlimited consequences can be heaped retroactively on the guilty party absent a statement of congressional intent to do so. 182 The Court also acknowledged that even where an action is illegal, a defendant company will not necessarily refrain from breaking the law; rather, a potential defendant might engage in a cost-benefit analysis of whether subjecting itself to liability would be worthwhile overall.
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182 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283 n.35. 183 The Court acknowledged the possibility of this ex ante calculation by saying that the new damages provisions "can be expected to give managers an added incentive to take preventive measures to ward off discriminatory conduct . . . before it occurs," id. at 283 n.35, and can be expected to "have an impact on private parties' planning," id. at 282. The Court's reasoning in Hughes 184 largely paralleled the Landgraf decision on the question of the relevant act for retroactivity analysis, analyzing the retroactivity question in reference to the alleged fraudulent conduct by the company. 185 Like Landgraf, the Hughes Court also quickly rejected the argument that because the company's alleged conduct was illegal when it acted, it is permissible to expose it to increased liability under a new law. 
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Martin involved ongoing attorneys' fees awarded to monitor compliance with a consent decree in a prison litigation case.
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Years after 184 Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) . Recall that the issue in that case was whether a new provision, which permitted qui tam suits under the False Claims Act where the government previously possessed information about the alleged corruption, could be used to sue a company for conduct occurring before the date of the new provision's enactment. Id. at 941. 185 Though the Hughes Court declined to decide whether the relevant conduct was Hughes Aircraft's submission of the allegedly false claim or the company's financial disclosures to the government in the course of an audit, see id. at 946 n.4 ("Because both [acts] occurred prior to the effective date of the 1986 amendments, we need not address which of these two events constitutes the relevant conduct for purposes of our retroactivity analysis."), the Court's reasoning was focused on the possibility of an impermissible retroactive effect caused by changing the rules of qui tam suits after an alleged fraudulent violation has occurred, see id. at 945 (noting that "[t]he allegedly false claims at issue in this case were submitted by Hughes between 1982 and 1984"). See also id. at 948-49 (concluding that the illegality of the submission of false claims does not preclude a finding of impermissible retroactive effect); id. at 948, 950 (arguing that the 1986 amendments do indeed create a new liability and a new cause of action for a company that is alleged to have submitted false claims); id. at 951 (holding that the 1986 amendments are not merely jurisdictional but impact whether a suit for submission of false claims "may be brought at all"). Nowhere in the decision did the Court analyze whether the amendments would be retroactive as applied to Hughes Aircraft's disclosure to the government. Thus, while the Court said it did not select which past conduct was relevant, all its analysis was focused squarely on the alleged crime committed by the defendant. 186 See id. at 947 ("The same argument was made, and rejected, in Landgraf . " ). 187 527 U.S. 343 (1999). 188 The detailed facts and procedural posture of the case, located at Martin, 527 U.S. at 349-50, are as follows: The Martin case grew out of two successful class action suits brought by prisoners against the Michigan prison system in 1977 and 1980, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 347-52. The prisoners were successful in both actions, and the federal trial court ordered the semi-annual payment of attorneys' fees, at the prevailing market rate, for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the court's decrees in both cases. By 1995, the prevailing market rate for attorneys was $150 per hour. The amount of the attorneys' fees payable to the prisoners' attorneys was brought into the fees were established, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) set new fee structures that were lower than the amount originally awarded. 189 The question before the Court was whether the new fee cap could be applied to cases where an ongoing attorneys' fee structure had already been put in place. The Justices unanimously agreed that the statute did not expressly authorize retroactive application of the new fee structure; however, this left the question of whether a retroactive effect would occur by applying the new law to past acts.
The major point of disagreement among the Justices involved what qualified as a "past act." As Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence, there were at least five separate points that could have been chosen as the relevant one: (1) the alleged violation that was the basis of the suit that gave rise to attorneys' fees; (2) the attorney's decision to bring the suit; (3) the filing of the suit; (4) the "doing of the legal work" that was the basis for the fees; or (5) the award by the court of attorneys' fees.
formed after the effective date of the PLRA, the PLRA has future effect on future work; this does not raise retroactivity concerns. 192 While the majority does not clearly state the decision rule that it adopts, the majority seems to select the point in time where the actor could choose to avoid all the consequences of the new law. 193 On this basis, the Court rejects the prisoners' argument that the relevant act is the attorneys' filing of the cases in 1977 and 1980 (Point 2), because the argument wrongly assumes that "the attorney's initial decision to file a case on behalf of a client is an irrevocable one." 194 In other words, the attorneys could still avoid the consequences of the PLRA by ceasing to work on the case once the new law was passed.
Interestingly, the dissent in Martin appears to adopt the same decisional rule as the majority, but finds that the parties could have avoided the consequences of the new law only at a much earlier point-at the time the attorneys chose to represent the prisoners (Point 2). 195 The rule adopted by the majority and the dissent is based on the concern that when a party cannot avoid the consequences of a new law, attaching new consequences to prior acts would result in a manifest injustice. 196 It is logical to draw this line based on injustice; after all, the reason our system has a presumption against retroactivity absent a clear congressional mandate is that we view retroactive laws as unjust.
The difficulty, of course, with simply adopting injustice or reliance as the rule for judging retroactive effect, as Justice Scalia notes in his concurrence, is that, "[i]n varying degrees," applying the new law to any of the five potential acts (Points A-E) would "frustrate expectations." 197 Instead, he suggests the following helpful rule:
sequently convicted of the crime, and only then encounters IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) relief. Under the rule adopted by both the majority and dissent in Martin, our hypothetical court would ask, "At what point in time could an immigrant have ensured that she would have avoided the consequences of IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c)?" The answer is that she could only ensure that she would not be subject to IIRIRA's elimination of the discretionary waiver at the time she committed the crime. Once she commits her crime, she cannot ensure that she will avoid conviction, and, therefore, IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c).
In contrast, under Justice Scalia's proposed rule from Martin, our court would ask: "What was the purpose of the new law, and what actions was it intended to regulate?" In the narrow sense, it could be said that IIRIRA's repeal of 212(c) was intended to ensure the deportation of those immigrants who had been convicted of aggravated felonies. But, following Justice Scalia's admonition to look at the broader, common sense purpose of the original act, it seems that repealing the waiver was intended to regulate primary conduct in two ways: first, by providing a disincentive for immigrants to commit certain crimes, and second, to remove certain types of immigrant law-breakers from the United States. The driving force behind repeal is not to deport people who courts have labeled as aggravated felons, but to deport people who pose a danger to society because they have committed certain crimes.
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It is not their conviction for crimes that causes concern about their presence in the United States, but the fact that they committed certain crimes at all. Therefore, it would be impermissibly retroactive to attach the new legal consequence of the repeal of 212(c) to immigrants who committed their crimes prior to the enactment of IIRIRA.
In summary, under either decisional rule offered in Martin, and under the holdings of both Landgraf and Hughes, the commission of the crime is the relevant point of analysis for 212(c) retroactivity decisions. Despite St. Cyr's command that retroactivity analysis should fully apply in the immigration context, the lower courts have generally not accepted the commission-of-the-crime argument. 203 See supra Part III.A (discussing the rule that the relevant event for retroactivity analysis is not commission but conviction).
courts that have undertaken a full analysis of the retroactive effect in reference to the commission of the crime have concluded that the commission of the crime is the relevant event.
204 But those cases have been universally overturned on appeal, and no circuit currently holds that the commission of the crime is the relevant act for retroactive effect analysis.
E. A Persistent Refusal To Apply Landgraf?
While the courts have easily viewed the commission of the crime as the relevant reference point for cases involving corporate wrongdoers like USI Film and Hughes Aircraft, they have refused to do so in the case of immigrant wrongdoers. Perhaps courts find the notion of immigrants contemplating the costs of individual crime-be it white collar crime (as in Ponnapula) or street crime (as in St. Cyr), beyond the pale, even absurd. Yet, both Landgraf and Hughes forcefully rejected the notion that normal retroactivity rules do not apply if the underlying activity is illegal.
This willingness of courts to apply one set of retroactivity rules to most retroactivity cases and another set to retroactivity cases involving immigrants is the sort of incongruity that St. Cyr was supposed to put an end to. With Ponnapula and Olatunji helping to return 212(c) retroactivity analysis to the framework of Landgraf, it is possible that lower courts will engage the commission-of-the-crime argument. At the very least, courts should seriously analyze the proposition, cease relying on the LaGuerre dicta, and systematically consider the Landgraf, Hughes, and Martin holdings as applied to the 212(c) context.
CONCLUSION
The recent circuit court decisions in Ponnapula and Olatunji offer hope that retroactivity analysis in the immigration context will finally conform to the framework of Landgraf and its progeny. While the Supreme Court's landmark decision in St. Cyr required full application of retroactivity analysis in the immigration context, 206 the lower courts have largely failed to follow this dictate. 204 
Id.
205 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (listing circuit court decisions that limit St. Cyr to the plea bargain context).
206 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324 (2000) (rejecting the INS argument that "application of the law of deportation can never have a retroactive effect").
Instead the lower courts have continued to ignore the clear framework of Landgraf and its progeny: (1) retroactivity analysis fundamentally involves statutory construction-an inquiry into the congressionally-mandated scope of the statute as to an entire class, not into individual, subjective reliance on the prior state of the law; (2) unfairness and the potential for reliance on the current state of the law are the reasons for the strong presumption against retroactivity, rather than the test for a retroactive effect; and the presumption against retroactivity is not a right to be earned by individuals, but a protection granted to all members of the class; (3) if Congress did not expressly mandate retroactive application of a statute, there is a presumption against retroactivity and a court may not permit any application that would cause a retroactive effect; to do otherwise would be nothing less than judicial legislation; (4) a retroactive effect occurs when a new law attaches new legal consequences to past acts; and (5) determining which past acts are relevant for the retroactive effect inquiry requires a clear test. The majority and dissent in Martin ask at what point a party could ensure it would not be subject to any of the new law's consequences; Scalia's concurrence suggests asking what the purpose of the statute is and what conduct it seeks to regulate. Under either of Martin's decisional rules, the relevant event for analysis of a retroactive effect in the 212(c) context is the commission of the underlying crime.
Following repeal of 212(c) relief in 1996, it took six years of misdirected decisions before the Supreme Court in St. Cyr ordered lower courts to fully apply its retroactivity jurisprudence to the immigration context. During those six years, many permanent residents were summarily deported without their rightful opportunity to apply for a waiver of deportation. Today, because the lower courts continue to incorrectly apply the retroactivity framework in 212(c) cases, permanent residents who committed their crime or turned down a plea offer and proceeded to trial before passage of IIRIRA continue to be denied the right to apply for the waiver of deportation to which they are entitled.
Hopefully, the recent decisions in the Third and Fourth Circuits will encourage other circuits to revisit their 212(c) decisions and fully apply Landgraf to these cases. To do less results in just the unfairness, overreaching, and judicial legislation that the presumption against retroactivity was designed to prevent.
